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Abstract
We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile tele-
phony, with and without strategic pricing, and taking into account
market penetration at entry, locked-in consumers and tariff-mediated
network externalities. We show that on/off-net differentials may re-
duce the possibility of entry if incumbents are large, while they have
no long-run effects if there are no locked-in consumers, or reduce the
difference in subscriber numbers in their presence. Asymmetric fixed-
to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile termination rates increase (decrease)
market share and profit of the network with the higher (lower) rate.
While the fixed-to-mobile waterbed effect is not full at the network
level, it will be full in the aggregate.
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1 Introduction
An issue that presently is hotly debated between mobile telephony operators
and national regulatory agencies is whether late entrants will be able to
reach market shares comparable to those of previous entrants. If they were,
there would be no need to maintain asymmetric regulation, such as higher
mobile termination charges for small operators, over the long run. Indeed,
the European Regulators’ Group (ERG) and the European Commission are
of the opinion that convergence in market shares will occur and that therefore
regulation should become symmetric rather sooner than later.
Central arguments that point to long-run persistence of market share
asymmetry are differences in dates of entry, market penetration of mobile
telephony, and operators’ pricing policies. In particular, small entrants argue
that:
• A large difference in entry dates (up to 10 years in some cases) leaves
incumbent networks with large numbers of locked-in customers;
• the larger the market penetration of mobile telephony at the date of
entry of the late entrant, the smaller will be the number of customers
that have not yet adhered to any mobile network, and thus the smaller
will be the entrant’s growth potential;
• the existence of on-/off-net differentials on large networks, i.e. differ-
ences between call prices within the same network and to other net-
works, make users prefer to be on large networks and therefore limit
entrants’ growth.
On the other hand, large incumbents and some regulators argue that
entrants in mobile markets should be able to naturally achieve large market
shares, and that failure to do so ultimately must be due to entrants’ strategic
mistakes. The European Regulators’ Common Position on the symmetry
of call termination rates (ERG 2008) is a case in point: The default is a
presumption that convergence will occur, and support is offered in the form
of numerical simulations (p.94). Yet, in these simulations convergence is
driven directly by the assumption that consumers join all networks in equal
numbers, while the entrants’ problem in reality is precisely that they may
attract fewer customers than large networks.
A paradigmatic case where (in a first phase) four operators entered at
different points in time and came to hold roughly equal market shares is
the United Kingdom. In most other countries, though, late entrants’ market
shares have remained small. Considering only entry dates, indeed the United
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Kingdom is special in that the fourth operator entered within two years of
the first adoption of digital technology, while in most other countries the
difference in entry dates was much larger. Thus later entry seems to lead
to a smaller long-run market share. This observation is reinforced by the
evolution of the UK’s fifth entrant, Hutchison, whose market share is still
very small a few years after entry.
To our knowledge, no attempt has been made so far to rebuild the static
theoretical models of telecommunications competition from a dynamic point
of view. Necessary ingredients should be: development of mobile penetration
over time, tariff-mediated network externalities and switching costs.
In this paper, will consider two models: First, a simple base-line model
where firms’ prices are identical and fixed, and networks grow in the pres-
ence of tariff-mediated network externalities and locked-in consumers. This
model serves to highlight the dynamic issues related to penetration, network
externalities and mobile call termination rates (MTRs).
In the second part of the paper we will consider how networks set prices
strategically when they take into account future market penetration. We
build and solve a differential game model of mobile network competition
in a growing market. In this paper we will concentrate on the long-run
outcome of this game, which will differ from the simple benchmark model
because this outcome will have been reached through networks’ choosing
prices strategically based on their strengths.
In this second model we will also consider the effect of fixed-to-mobile
(F2M) call termination rates and asymmetry in both termination rates.
While mobile-to-mobile (M2M) termination rates affect on-/off-net differen-
tials and thus tariff-mediated network effects, F2M termination rates affect
the size of networks’ “war chest”. Thus their economic effects are different,
and in our models we will consider them separately.
Our results are as follows: The simple non-strategic model without strate-
gic pricing indicates that tariff-mediated network effects do matter, and in
two respects: First, if the incumbent is sufficiently large at the entry date,
then entry will fail. Second, if the market itself is very large in the long run
then the entrant may get pushed out of the market by network effects.
Considering the complete differential where firms set prices responding
to each other’s subscriber numbers the above conclusion about the long run
must be reconsidered. While the entrant cannot fully catch up with the
incumbent if the latter starts out with locked-in consumers, tariff-mediated
network effects due to positive (small and symmetric) mobile-to-mobile termi-
nation charges increase (rather than decrease) the entrant’s long-run market
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share. Moreover, a larger total market size reduces (rather than increases)
the difference.1
On the other hand, if there are no locked-in clients then both networks’
long-run subscriber numbers will be equal, even if there are tariff-mediated
network effects. The qualification in this case and the previous one is that
network effects must not be too strong. If they were very strong then the
entrant would not be sustainable in the long run.
A second set of results concerns differences in MTRs. While F2M and
M2M rates work through different channels, their effects are similar: The
network that is allowed to charge more for termination enjoys a higher market
share and higher profits in the long run. We also show that while with
symmetric fixed-to-mobile termination rates we have a full “waterbed effect”,
i.e. termination profits are fully handed on to mobile consumers, this is no
longer true if F2M rates differ. In this latter case the network with the higher
rate keeps part of the termination profits, while the other network actually
spends more. On aggregate both effects cancel out, so that the waterbed
effect is still full if we consider the whole market.
As an additional step we consider the importance of consumer expecta-
tions for price formation. If consumers’ expectations are not consistent with
their future behavior then networks will use this to their advantage by rais-
ing per-minute prices. On the other hand, if expectations are consistent then
under two-part tariffs marginal cost pricing will prevail.
2 Literature Review
The equilibria and growth of network markets comprising single networks
have been investigated since the seminal papers of Artle and Averous (1973)
and Rohlfs (1974). The latter considered equilibrium configurations with
network effects, while the former made a first attempt at deriving the logis-
tic (S-shaped) growth curve from an out-of-equilibrium adjustment process.
On the other hand, Cabral (1990) considered general continuous-time market
grow processes under network effects, where the growth curve is drawn out
by network equilibria which are shifted by an exogenous process affecting
consumer preferences. Geroski (2000) considers different processes such as
spread of information, differences between adopters and informational cas-
cades which give rise to an S curve-like diffusion process.
1One caveat is in order: While in related work (Hoernig 2007) we have explicitly
considered the interplay of call externalities and tariff-mediated network effects, in the
present paper the former are absent — their inclusion would render the model intractable.
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Gruber and Verboven (2001) consider an econometric model of the dif-
fusion of mobile telephony in the European Union. They fit an S-curve and
determine the effect of regulation and technology on diffusion speed and pen-
etration. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) show that technical standardization
accelerates diffusion and entry in mobile telephony. Doganoglu and Grzy-
bowski (2007 ) consider diffusion and network effects in the German mobile
market. They show that diffusion is affected strongly by the total number of
mobile subscribers, but less so by their distribution over different networks.
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and Mueller (1997) survey several
demand and supply side reasons of why a first-mover advantage can arise.
Examples of supply side effects are learning curve effects, patents and pre-
emption of scarce assets, while demand side effects are uncertainty about
quality, switching costs, and network effects. In our paper we will concen-
trate exclusively on the latter two.
Arthur (1989) studied competition between networks in a model of tech-
nology adoption. His emphasis is on the process that may tip the market to
monopoly. De Bijl and Peitz (2002) consider competition and regulation in
telecommunications markets in the presence of entrants. Their models are
dynamic in the sense that the entrants’ disadvantage disappears over time,
but this process is exogenous and cannot be influenced by market players.
In other words, whether it leads to equality in the long run depends on the
researcher’s assumptions and not on market forces.
Some empirical work relevant to our paper is the following: Huff and
Robinson (1994) find that first entrants have sustainable market share ad-
vantages which third and later entrants are not able to erode even in the long
run. Leo (2004) provides an overview of relative market entry dates of early
and late entrants in European mobile telephony markets, and concludes that
there is a clear first-mover advantage. Atiyas and Dogan (2007) show that, in
the Turkish market, an incumbent duopoly lasting seven years significantly
impaired the growth prospects of late entrants and advocate specific policy
measures for fostering entrants’ growth. Bijwaard et al (2008), in an econo-
metric analysis, find that late entrants are at a clear disadvantage. Historical
penetration levels are especially relevant, and it is more difficult to enter in
markets with more existing players.
Tariff-mediated network externalities in telecommunications competition
have until now between considered in a purely static context. In Laffont et
al (1998), and most subsequent models, on-/off-net differentials are caused
by above-cost termination charges. Hoernig (2007) showed that on-/off-net
differentials arise also if networks take into account consumers’ utility of
receiving calls, and that in equilibrium larger networks choose larger differ-
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entials than small networks. Furthermore, small networks incur enduring
access deficits towards larger networks. Peitz (2005) considered the effects of
asymmetric termination charges in the presence of on-/off-net differentiation.
ERG (2008), in position paper on the future regulation of mobile termina-
tion charges in the EU, argues that smaller networks should be allowed to
charge higher termination charges, but only on a transitory basis. Reasons
mentioned for letting them do so are exogenous cost differences and access
deficits due to above-cost termination charges.
Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2008) consider the effects of switching costs on
competition in mobile telephony. See also Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for
a general treatment of switching costs and network effects.
3 A Simple Model of Pure Network Effects
3.1 Setup and First Results
Here we consider a simple model of market share dynamics, where for sim-
plicity we assume networks’ prices are constant and equal. Thus we do not
consider a game between networks, in order to concentrate on the network ef-
fects created by date of entry, customer stock and market penetration. The
second part of the paper will be dedicated to pricing issues and strategic
behavior, modelled as a fully-fledged differential game.
We take the market growth process as such as exogenous, i.e. there is no
feedback of entry on market growth. The advantage of this approach is that
we can do without making specific assumptions about the market growth
curve.2 It also reduces the dimension of the state space, which reduces the
complexity of the model. Thus assume that time t ≥ 0 is continuous and that
mobile market penetration Z (t), i.e. the total number of mobile telephony
subscribers, is an exogenous, increasing and continuously differentiable func-
tion of time. Let Z (0) = Z0 > 0 and Z∞ = limt→∞ Z (t) < ∞, that is, we
assume that at time zero the market already exists, and that in the long run
its growth levels off. There are two networks, where network 1 is the incum-
bent and network 2 is the entrant. Subscriber numbers are s1 (t) and s2 (t),
respectively, with s1 (t)+s2 (t) = Z (t) and s1 (0) = Z (0), i.e. the second en-
try occurs at time zero and s2 (0) = 0. Market shares are αi (t) = si (t) /Z (t).
It turns out that it is more intuitive in the following to work with subscriber
numbers than with market shares.
2In related research we consider the effect of mobile termination charges on market
growth and fixed-to-mobile substitution. There the market growth process is endogenous.
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Networks’ prices are fixed, exogenous and symmetric. The price of a call
minute from network i to network j is pij, with corresponding indirect utility
per recipient of vij = v (pij) = maxq u (q) − pijq, where v and u are con-
sumers’ indirect and direct utility functions over call minutes, respectively.
For further reference, note that −dvij/dpij = qij is the quantity of call min-
utes from network i to network j. On-/off-net differentials are created by
prices pij > pii. A common example of different prices for on- and off-net
calls arises under two-part tariffs, as we will assume here: The prices of calls
are equal to their marginal cost c +m, where c > 0 is the cost of an on-net
call. We have m = 0 for on-net calls, and m > 0 is the additional cost due to
an above-cost MTR of off-net calls. If we define pm = c+m and vm = v (pm)
for m ≥ 0, then δ = v0− vm > 0 measures the size of on-/off-net differentials
in terms of consumer surplus from calling network i from either network i or
j.
Networks i = 1, 2 also charge a fixed fee Fi, and for now we assume that
F1 = F2. A consumer on network i therefore obtains the surplus at time t of
wi (t) = si (t) v0 + sj (t) vm − Fi +K, (1)
where K is additional surplus unrelated to mobile subscriber numbers, for
example the benefits of mobility or mobile-to-fixed calls. We assume that K
is the same for both networks.
The two networks’ services are differentiated in Hotelling fashion, with
networks 1 and 2 occupying the left and right ends of a line of length 1, re-
spectively. Consumers joining the market at time t are uniformly distributed
along this line, with their mass given by Z˙ = dZ/dt. We assume that con-
sumers are myopic and base their decision which network to join on present
subscriber numbers.3
The share of new consumers joining network 2 is given by
y (t) =
1
2
+ σ (w2 (t)− w1 (t)) (2)
=
1
2
+ σδ (s2 (t)− s1 (t)) , (3)
where σ > 0 measures the strength of horizontal preferences, i.e. competition
is more intense if σ is large. Since we intend to model a market where the
entrant has a non-zero market share, normally we assume that σ is small
enough so that for all t we have y (t) ∈ (0, 1).
3While we will consider forward-looking consumers in section 3.2, we believe that this
is a plausible assumption, especially when consumers can switch networks.
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Expression (3) shows that competition under equal prices conflates the
competitiveness of the market (σ) with the strength of tariff-mediated net-
work effects (δ), and that the difference in surplus offered to consumers is
determined by the difference in subscriber numbers s2 − s1. Still, we will
see below that long-run market shares depend on how many consumers are
willing to switch networks.
For a start, we make the extreme assumption that switching costs are so
high that consumers will never switch networks. The evolution of subscriber
numbers of network 2 is thus given by s2 (0) = 0 and, since s1 = Z − s2,
s˙2 = Z˙y = Z˙
[
1
2
+ σδ (2s2 − Z)
]
, (4)
while y > 0. If y ≤ 0 then s˙2 = 0. Thus the market share path for y > 0 is
described by a linear differential equation, which has solution
s2 (t) =
Z (t)
2
−
Z0
2
e2σδ(Z(t)−Z0). (5)
This expression means that without network effects (δ = 0) half of new
consumers would join the entrant network, while the existence of network
effects drives an ever greater number of consumers to the large network.
We can now state some results concerning network growth:
Proposition 1 If networks charge symmetric prices and consumers never
switch, then
1. If Z0 ≥ Z
∗ = 1/2σδ the entrant gains zero market share.
2. If Z0 < Z
∗, the entrant network grows while Z (t) < Z0−
ln(2σδZ0)
2σδ
. This
upper limit and the entrant’s speed of growth decline with initial market
penetration Z0.
3. The entrant’s long-run subscriber number s2 (∞) decreases with initial
market penetration Z0 and the strength of termination-mediated net-
work effects δ. There is a Z¯ > 0 such that s2 (∞) increases (decreases)
with growth potential Z∞ if Z∞ < (>) Z¯.
Proof. We have that s˙2 (t) = Z˙ (t)
(
1
2
− σδZ0e
2σδ(Z(t)−Z0)
)
> 0, where the
second term is decreasing in Z (t). The first result is equivalent to s˙2 (0) ≤ 0,
and the first part of the second is equivalent to s˙2 (t) ≥ 0. The rest follows
because ds˙2/dZ0 has the sign of (2σδZ0 − 1). As for the third point: In
the long run we have s2 (∞) =
(
Z∞ − Z0e
2σδ(Z∞−Z0)
)
/2. Taking derivatives
leads to the above result.
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The difference in subscriber numbers between the incumbent network 1
and the entrant 2 is
s1 (t)− s2 (t) = Z0e
2σδ(Z(t)−Z0),
which increases exponentially in Z (t) if δ > 0. Thus even if the entrant
network grows, the incumbent network’s size increases even faster due to
network effects.
Now we reconsider network growth assuming that (Z − Y1) consumers
are eventually able to switch networks, where 0 ≤ Y1 ≤ s1 (0) is the number
clients who are locked-in forever at the incumbent network. We assume that
consumers (Z − Y1) are locked for some time until they become mobile at a
rate of χ. These customers either rejoin their previous network or switch to
the competing network, based on prices and subscriber numbers at time t.
New and switching consumers of the mobile group will join the entrant’s
network according to
y (t) =
1
2
+ σδ (s2 − s1) ,
just as before. While y > 0, the entrant’s growth in the first group of
consumers is described by s2 (0) = 0 and
s˙2 =
(
Z˙ + χ (Z − Y1)
)[1
2
+ σδ (2s2 − Z)
]
− χs2. (6)
The interpretation of this expression is the following: At each point in time,
χs2 customers join the pool of customers that are selecting an operator,
whose total size is
(
Z˙ + χ (Z − Y1)
)
. A share y of the latter then join the
entrant’s network. If y ≤ 0 at some t then s˙2 = −χs2 ever after, i.e. the
entrant will shrink to zero.
We obtain the following results:
Proposition 2 If the incumbent has Y1 locked-in clients at t ≥ 0, then:
1. If Z0 ≥ Z
∗ the entrant gains zero market share.
2. If Z∞ < Z
∗ then the entrant’s long-run number of subscribers is
s2 (∞) =
1
2
(Z∞ − Y1)
(
1−
Y1
Z∗ − (Z∞ − Y1)
)
, (7)
which is decreasing in σ, δ and Y1. If Z∞ − Y0 ≥ Z
∗ then s2 (∞) = 0.
8
Proof. The first statement follows from s˙2 (0) ≤ 0. The second statement
follows from the steady state condition
0 = χ (Z∞ − Y1)
(
1
2
+ σδ (2s2 − Z∞)
)
− χs2
and s2 (∞) > 0. This value is consistent with y (∞) ≥ 0 if Z∞ ≤ Z
∗.
Based on this simple model, and neglecting the strategic aspect of pricing,
we have arrived at the following conclusions: A combination of high tariff-
mediated network effects and a high number of subscribers at the incumbent
make entry as such more difficult. In the long run, the entrant only survives if
these network effects are not too strong, and if he does then an initial number
of locked-in clients on the incumbent network translates into an even larger
difference in subscribers in the long run.
The above analysis is limited by the assumption of equal and constant
prices. It does not allow networks to set prices in a forward-looking manner,
nor does it allow for a “fat cat”-effect due to locked-in consumers. As we will
see, considering dynamic strategic pricing will make a difference.
3.2 Forward-looking Consumers
Contrary to what has been assumed in the previous section, we now consider
consumers who are forward-looking and base the evaluation of benefits on
their expectations of networks’ long-run subscriber numbers. This assump-
tion would makes sense if the market that develops fully over a very short
period of time.
Let the expected final numbers of non-locked-in subscribers be s∞i , then
y =
1
2
+ σδ (s∞2 − s
∞
1 ) ,
if y > 0. Note that since y no longer depends on time, at each moment a
constant proportion of consumers joins network 2.
We find the following result:
Proposition 3 If consumers are forward-looking, then
1. If Z∞ ≥ Z
∗ the entrant gains zero market share.
2. If Z∞ < Z
∗ then the entrant’s long-run number of subscribers is
s∞2 =
1
2
(Z∞ − Y1)
(
1−
Y1
Z∗ − (Z∞ − Y1)
)
. (8)
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Proof. 1. No non-locked-in consumers will join network 2, i.e. if and only
if they believe that y ≤ 0, or s∞2 ≤ (Z∞ − Z
∗) /2. This belief is consistent
with the equilibrium outcome if and only if s∞2 = 0, or Z∞ ≥ Z
∗.
2. On the other hand, if y > 0 we obtain the law of motion
s˙2 =
(
Z˙ + χ (Z − Y1)
)[1
2
+ σδ (2s∞2 − Z∞)
]
− χs2.
Consumers’ expectations are correct if s∞2 = s2 (∞) > 0. These are then
determined by the condition s˙2 = 0, with the above solution for (Z∞ − Y1) <
Z∗. This value is consistent with y > 0, or s∞2 > (Z∞ − Z
∗) /2, if Z∞ < Z
∗,
which is a stricter condition.
The long-run market share is identical to the one we found above in (7)
assuming myopic consumers. The reason why both coincide is that churn
reshuﬄes consumers toward long-run market shares.
One difference between the two cases of myopic and forward-looking con-
sumers here is that the possibility of entry in the segment of non-captive
consumers depends on the value of Z0 for the former, and Z∞ for the latter.
Thus with forward-looking consumers entry as such becomes more difficult,
while the conditions for long-run survival are the same.
4 Endogenous Pricing
In this section we focus on networks’ pricing decisions and how they will use
pricing to steer growth. For simplicity, we will only consider consumers who
may eventually be able to switch, i.e. the total number of mobile market
customers at time t is Z (t).4
4.1 Model Setup of Dynamic Network Competition
Suppose that networks set their two-part tariffs Ti (t) = (pii (t) , pij (t) , Fi (t)),
i = j in continuous time. Since competing mobile networks can observe each
other’s pricing decisions, we assume a “closed-loop information structure”,
i.e. networks observe past actions. Thus networks will react to each other’s
pricing, and the adequate equilibrium concept for competitive behavior is
Markov-perfect equilibrium where networks set prices based on each others’
subscriber numbers.
4Considering locked-in consumers as above adds a second state variable, which makes
the model much more difficult to solve, unless one assumes that these consumers do not
react to price differences.
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At each point in time t, new and churning consumers choose one of the two
available contracts, with tariffs Ti (t). These tariffs are valid for the duration
of the contract, and contracts terminate at rate χ > 0. Similar to what we
assumed above, at time t = 0 there is a group of clients 0 < Y1 ≤ s1 (0) on
the incumbent network who will never switch. For consistency of notation
let Y2 = 0 and Y = Y1+Y2. Thus the size of the cohort selecting networks at
time t is Z˙ + χ (Z − Y ). These consumers choose networks myopically, and
thus a fraction yi (t) adheres to network i:
yi (t) =
1
2
+ σ [si (t) (vii − vji)− sj (t) (vjj − vij)− Fi + Fj ]
=
1
2
+ σ (2δsi − δjZ − Fi + Fj) , (9)
where δi = (vii − vji) is the difference in surplus of calling network i from
either network i or j, and δ = (δi + δj) /2. If networks set the same per-
minute prices we have δi = δ.
We also assume that consumers who join at time t only make calls to
other consumers they know are already on either one of the networks. This
assumption maintains consistency with consumer expectations and simplifies
flow profits. We will analyze the implications of different assumptions about
consumer expectations and calling patterns below in Section 4.4.1.
Flow profits at time u ≥ t, per consumer joining network i at time t, are
Pi (t) = Fi (t) + si (t) (pii (t)− c) qii (t) (10)
+sj (t) (pij (t)− c−m) qij (t) ,
where c and m = a− ct are the on-net cost of calls and the margin between
mobile-to-mobile termination charge and termination cost, respectively. The
discounted profits from a consumer joining at time t are
P˜i (t) =
∫
∞
t
Pi (t) e
−(χ+r)(u−t)du =
1
r + χ
Pi (t) .
Thus network i’s discounted profits over all cohorts of consumers joining at
t ≥ 0 are5
Πi =
∫
∞
0
[
yi (t)
(
Z˙ (t) + χZ (t)
)
P˜i (t) + si (t) sj (t)Qi + si (t)Ri
]
e−rtdt−Mi,
(11)
5The incumbent network will continue to make profits on clients that have joined before
time 0, but these profits are not relevant for future pricing decisions.
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where Qi = miqji and Ri = (bi − ct) qfi are profits from mobile-to-mobile
and fixed-to-mobile termination. Both Qi and Ri are assumed to be piece-
wise constant. In particular, we want to be able to analyze the effect of
transitory termination rate asymmetries Q2 > Q1 and / or R2 > R1. Let
Q = (Q1 +Q2) /2 and R = (R1 +R2) /2. The term M0 refers to discounted
mobile termination profits of clients who are already present at time 0, which
for simplicity we have counted in the first expression,
Mi =
∫
∞
0
(
Yie
−rt + (si (0)− Yi) e
−(r+χ)t
)
(Ri +Qisj (0)) dt
= (Ri +Qisj (0))
(
Yi
r
+
si (0)− Yi
r + χ
)
,
where the latter identity holds if Ri is constant over time. EvidentlyM1 > 0
and M2 = 0.
First we show that under two-part tariffs networks charge prices per
minute equal to marginal cost.
Conjecture 4 At each t ≥ 0 we have pii (t) = c and pij (t) = c + m, for
i = 1, 2 and j = i.
Proof. . Consider a given path of subscriber shares y (t), t ≥ 0, and
therefore also of subscriber numbers si and sj. In order to maximize prof-
its Πi over pii and pij given the path y, network i maximizes every P˜i (t),
substituting Fi from (9).
F1 =
1
σ
(
y −
1
2
)
− s2 (t) (v22 − v12) + s1 (t) (v11 − v21) + F2.
Thus network i solves:
max
pii
1
r + χ
[si (t) vii (t) + si (t) (pii (t)− c) qii (t)] ,
max
pij
1
r + χ
[sj (t) vij (t) + sj (t) (pij (t)− c−m) qij (t)] .
The corresponding first-order conditions are
si (t)
r + χ
[−qii + qii + (pii − c) q
′
ii] = 0,
sj (t)
r + χ
[
−qij + qij + (pij − c−m) q
′
ij
]
= 0,
which lead to the above result.
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Because calls are priced as cost we obtain Pi (t) = Fi (t). Defining ζ (t) =
Z˙ (t) + χ (Z (t)− Y ), flow profits and the law of motion become:
Πi =
∫
∞
0
[
ζyiFi
r + χ
+ si (Z − si)Qi + siRi
]
e−rtdt
s˙i = ζyi − χ (si − Yi) .
Together with (9), we have a linear-quadratic differential game with time-
varying coefficients, for which Markov-perfect equilibria exist and can be
characterized (see e.g. Dockner et al 2000 ).
4.2 Pricing Equilibrium
4.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
Since we will determine aMarkov-perfect equilibrium, we will use the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation describing the value function V i = Πi+Mi and pric-
ing policy Fi corresponding to each player’s maximization problem. Letting
πi be flow profits, the HJB equation is
rV i (si, t)−
∂V i
∂t
(x, t) = max
Fi
{
πi +
∂V i
∂si
(si, t) s˙i
}
(12)
Since the game is linear-quadratic, policy functions will be linear in the state,
Fi (t) = g
i
1 (t) si (t) + g
i
0 (t) ,
and value functions quadratic,
V i (si, t) = V
i
2 (t) s
2
i (t) + V
i
1 (t) si (t) + V
i
0 (t) ,
where V i2 (t) < 0. We find the following necessary conditions (The proofs of
this and the next proposition can be found in the appendix):
Proposition 5 1. The equilibrium value function parameters must obey the
following differential equations: W2 = V
i
2 + V
j
2 is defined by the Riccati dif-
ferential equation
W˙2 = 2Q+ (r + 2χ)W2 −
8σ
9
ζ
r + χ
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
2 , (13)
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and the parameters V ik then follow the linear differential equations
V˙ i2 = Qi + (r + 2χ)V
i
2 −
4σ
9
ζ
r + χ
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
2 , (14)
V˙ i1 =
4σζ
9
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
(
δjZ −
3
2σ
r + χ
+ V j1 − V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)
(15)
+(r + χ)V i1 − 2χYiV
i
2 − ZQi −Ri,
V˙ i0 = rV
i
0 − χYiV
i
1 −
σ (r + χ) ζ
9
(
δjZ −
3
2σ
r + χ
+ V j1 − V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)2
.(16)
The boundary conditions are limt→∞W2 = W¯2 and limt→∞ V
i
k → V¯
i
k , which
are the long-run equilibrium values derived in the next section.
2. The equilibrium policy function parameters are given by
gi1 =
2
3
δ +
2
3
(r + χ)
(
V j2 − 2V
i
2
)
, (17)
gi0 =
1
2σ
−
1
3
δjZ −
r + χ
3
(
V j1 + 2V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)
. (18)
As is typical for linear-quadratic differential games, the fundamental
equation describing the equilibrium is a Riccati equation, which normally
is solved using numerical methods.
We would like to highlight one case where the model can be solved an-
alytically. This is the case where Z˙ + χ (Z − Y ) = χ (Z∞ − Y ) for all t, or
Z (t) = Z∞ − (Z∞ − Z0) e
−χt, which can thus be seen as an approximation
to the upper branch of a logistic growth curve with convergence rate χ. For
this specific case, condition (13) has an unstable negative steady state and
a stable positive steady state for the parameter W2.
6 The unstable steady
state is equal to the long-run equilibrium value W¯2, and being an unstable
steady state, there is no other solution candidate that converges to it. Thus
W2 (t) = W¯2 for all t is the only solution candidate. Using this result, it
is easy to see that all value function and policy function parameters will be
constant and equal to their long-run values.
4.3 The Long-Run Equilibrium
4.3.1 Steady State Conditions
In the long run market size will converge to Z∞ while Z˙ → 0, i.e. ζ →
χ (Z∞ − Y ). The parameters of the value function V
i
k and g
i
l also converge
to limit values V¯ ik and g¯
i
l , and subscriber numbers converge to s
∞
i .
6We develop the corresponding proofs in the next section. For similar arguments about
boundary conditions see the book by Dockner et al..
14
Proposition 6 The long-run value function is characterized as follows:
1. If m1 and m2 are small enough there is a unique W¯2 < 0, with
W¯2 = −
δ
r + χ
+ 3
3 (r + 2χ)−
√
9 (r + 2χ)2 + 32σζ (2Q (r + χ)− δ (r + 2χ))
16σ (r + χ) ζ
2. The value function parameters are given by
V¯ i2 =
Qj −Qi
2 (r + 2χ)
+
W¯2
2
,
V¯ i0 =
χ
r
YiV¯
i
1 +
σ (r + χ) ζ
9
(
δjZ −
3
2σ
(r + χ)
+ V¯ j1 − V¯
i
1 + 2ZV¯
j
2
)2
,
and we state the expression for V¯ i1 in the proof.
With symmetric termination, i.e. Q1 = Q2 and R1 = R2, we obtain
V¯ i2 =
W¯2
2
, V¯ i1 − V¯
j
1 = −
AχW¯2
(r + χ)
(Yi − Yj) ,
where A =
(
8ζσ
9(r+χ)
(δ + (r + χ)X11)− 1
)
−1
, and the policy function param-
eters
g1 = g
i
1 = g
j
1 =
2
3
δ −
1
3
(r + χ) W¯2,
gi0 =
1
2σ
−
1
3
δZ −
r + χ
3
(
V j1 + 2V
i
1 + ZW¯2
)
.
Thus in the long run networks’ pricing in response to a group of locked-in
customers of the incumbent network differs only in the constant part of the
policy function, with
gi0 − g
j
0 =
r + χ
3
(
V¯ j1 − V¯
i
1
)
=
AχW¯2
3
(Yi − Yj) .
Since we assumed Y1 > 0 and Y2 = 0, it is the incumbent network that sets a
higher fixed fee in the long run even if subscriber numbers we to equalize. On
the other hand, differences in locked-in consumers do not affect how networks
set their fixed fee as a function of size, i.e. g1 is unaffected.
Since one can show that g1 > 0 if m is small, the larger network then
sets a higher fixed fee for two reasons: 1. Its larger base of initial locked-in
customers, 2. a larger long-run market share.
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4.3.2 The Determinants of Long-Run Subscriber Numbers
Our next step is to consider this distribution of subscribers in the long run
when both networks remain in the market. Setting s˙i = ζyi−χ (si − Yi) = 0,
substituting the policy functions and solving for s∞i = si (∞), we obtain
s∞i =
1
2
Z∞ + Yi − Yj − 2σ (Z∞ − Y )
((
δj − g
j
1
)
Z∞ + g
i
0 − g
j
0
)
1 + σ (Z∞ − Y )
(
gi1 + g
j
1 − 2δ
) . (19)
This long-run steady state is stable if 1 + σ (Z∞ − Y )
(
gi1 + g
j
1 − 2δ
)
> 0,
which is true for small mi.
In order to consider the effects of the initial number of locked-in cus-
tomers, assume again symmetric termination charges. In this case we have
s∞i =
1
2
(Z∞ − Y ) + Yi − θ (Yi − Yj) (20)
where
θ =
σ (Z∞ − Y )
(
χAW¯2
3
+ gi1 − δ
)
1 + 2σ (Z∞ − Y ) (gi1 − δ)
,
That is, subscriber numbers in the long run result from an equal distribution
over both networks of the new and non-locked-in subscribers, the original
number of locked-in subscribers, and an additional portion whose distribution
depends on the initial difference in locked-in customers.
We have the following result:
Proposition 7 If termination is symmetric and above cost (m is positive
but small) then long-run difference in subscriber numbers is smaller than the
incumbent’s number of locked-in clients.
Proof. ATaylor expansions aroundm = 0 shows that θ ≈ σ
3
(Z∞ − Y ) q (c)m >
0, which together with Y1 > 0 and Y2 = 0 yields the result.
Thus a positive but sufficiently small on-/off-net differential may actually
increase the size of the entrant in the long run. The reason for this is that
the incumbent will charge a higher fixed fee, and therefore the entrant can
partially (but never fully) catch up.
A second question is: If there is no initial group of locked-in customers
with the incumbent, do we need asymmetric termination charges, either fixed
or mobile, in order to achieve equal long-run subscriber numbers? The answer
is clear:
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Proposition 8 If termination is symmetric and there are no locked-in cus-
tomers at the incumbent, in the long-run subscriber numbers will be equal.
Proof. Immediate by setting Y1 = Y2 = 0 in (20).
A third issue that we want to address is the effect of the long-run size of
the market Z∞ on the imbalance in subscriber numbers. Will a larger market
in the long run swamp initial differences or amplify them? The answer is the
following:
Proposition 9 If termination is symmetric, a larger long-run market size
reduces the difference in subscriber numbers due to differences in locked-in
clients if m is positive (but small).
Proof. As was shown in the proof of Proposition 7, the multiplier θ is
increasing in (Z∞ − Y ).
4.3.3 Mobile Termination Rates
As a final point, we consider the effects of termination charges. First we
show an important result concerning fixed-to-mobile termination:
Proposition 10 If fixed-to-mobile termination is symmetric there is a full
waterbed effect, i.e. termination profits are fully passed on to consumers on
both networks. If fixed-to-mobile termination rates differ (while m1 = m2
and sufficiently small) then the network with the higher (lower) rate has a
less (more) than full waterbed, which translates into an increase (decrease)
in market share and profits. Yet on aggregate the waterbed effect is still full.
Proof. With R1 = R2 = R, one can show that g
i
0 = −R + const, where the
latter does not depend on R. Since gi1 does not depend on R, this implies that
fixed fees Fi are reduced by the full amount of fixed-to-mobile termination
profits.
If R1 = R2, then g
i
0 =
1
2σ
− 2
3
Ri −
1
3
Rj + O (m) but g
1
0 + g
2
0 =
1
σ
− Ri −
Rj +O (m). Furthermore, we find that
Πi = V
i
2 (s
∞
1 )
2 + V i1 s
∞
1 + V
i
0 − (Ri +Qisj)
(
Yi
r
+
si − Yi
r + χ
)
=
1
2σ
χ
r + χ
Z∞ − Y
2
(
1 +
2
3
σ (Ri −Rj)
)2
+O (m) ,
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and
s∞i = Y1 +
Z∞ − Y
2
(
1 +
2
3
σ (R1 −R2)
)
+O (m) .
Thus as is common in static models of network competition in two-part tar-
iffs, we obtain a full waterbed effect for fixed-to-mobile termination rates in
the symmetric case that is usually considered. But an important qualification
arises: Differences in termination rates matter. The network with the higher
fixed-to-mobile termination rates will indeed have an advantage, and passes
less of its higher termination profits to consumers. On the other hand, the
network with the lower charges passes on more than it receives to consumers.
These two effects compensate so that in this model the waterbed effect is still
full when considering the whole market rather than single firms.
As concerns mobile-to-mobile termination rates, similar results hold. As-
sume now that fixed-to-mobile termination rates are identical (R1 = R2), and
that the incumbent’s mobile-to-mobile termination is cost-based, i.e. δ1 = 0
and Q1 = 0.
Proposition 11 If the incumbent’s mobile-to-mobile termination is cost-
based, the entrant’s (incumbent’s) market and profits increase (decrease) with
a positive (but small) termination margin m2.
Proof. For small m2, we have s
∞
1 ≈ Y1 +
Z∞−Y1
2
(1− σηq (c)m2) and s
∞
2 ≈
Z∞−Y1
2
(1 + σηq (c)m2) where η > 0. Furthermore,
Π1 ≈
Z∞ − Y1
2
(
1
2σ
χ
r + χ
− q (c) γ1m2
)
,
Π2 ≈
Z∞ − Y2
2
(
1
2σ
χ
r + χ
+ q (c) γ2m2
)
,
where γi > 0.
Thus both an asymmetry in fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile termi-
nation rates can help the entrant grow. Which of the two is better in terms
of welfare, i.e. fewer distortions, cannot be established without specifying
the effect on the surplus of consumers on the fixed network.
4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 The Importance of Consistent Consumer Expectations
Above we have assumed that networks’ clients only make calls to those cus-
tomers that they know of when they join their respective networks, which
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is consistent with the assumption of myopic consumers. We have seen that
under this assumption the standard pricing formulas under two-part tariffs
remain valid.
Now we will consider the implications of clients making calls even to
others who join later. This implies that consumers’ myopic expectations and
their actual calling behavior are inconsistent, which networks can exploit.
Flow profits at time u ≥ t, per consumer joining network i at time t,
become
Pi (t, u) = Fi (t) + si (u) (pii (t)− c) qii (t)
+sj (u) (pij (t)− c−m) qij (t) . (21)
Letting
s˜i (t) = (r + χ)
∫
∞
t
si (u) e
−(χ+r)(u−t)du,
we have s˜i (t) > si (t) while network i grows. The discounted profits from a
consumer joining at time t are
P˜i (t) =
∫
∞
t
Pi (t, u) e
−(χ+r)(u−t)du
=
1
r + χ
(Fi (t) + s˜i (u) (pii (t)− c) qii (t)
+ s˜j (u) (pij (t)− c−m) qij (t)) .
Profits Πi are defined as before. Let η = −pq
′/q be the price elasticity of
demand. We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 12 If networks’ clients make calls to other clients who join
later, but do not take this into account when selecting networks, then networks
set per-minute prices above cost. More precisely,
pii (t)− c
pii (t)
=
s˜i (t)− si (t)
s˜i (t)
1
η
,
pij (t)− (c+m)
pij (t)
=
s˜j (t)− sj (t)
s˜j (t)
1
η
.
Proof. . Consider a given path of subscriber shares y (t), t ≥ 0, and
therefore also of subscriber numbers si and sj. In order to maximize prof-
its Πi over pii and pij given the path y, network i maximizes every P˜i (t),
substituting Fi from (9). Thus network i solves:
max
pii
{sivii + s˜i (pii − c) qii} ,
max
pij
{sjvij + s˜j (pij − c−m) qij}
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As for the on-net price, the first-order condition is
(s˜i − si) qii + s˜i (pii − c) q
′
ii = 0,
which leads to the above result. As concerns the off-net price, the first-order
condition is similar since the only substantial difference stems from the higher
off-net cost:
(s˜j − sj) qij + s˜j (pij − c−m) q
′
ij = 0.
Thus we have shown the maybe counter-intuitive result that networks
would charge higher per-minutes prices while they are growing if consumers
are myopic. Prices then level off downwards towards marginal cost when the
market reaches maturity. The reason for these above-cost prices per minute is
that networks know that consumers will make more calls once on the network
than what they considered when choosing networks.
Actually, given that networks compete in two-part tariffs, the higher per-
minute prices will be compensated by lower fixed fees. That is, while we
can have “penetration pricing” implemented through fixed fees (including
handset subsidies), networks charge prices above cost to cash in on network
growth.
Let us now assume that consumers foresee perfectly how networks’ market
shares develop, and also take into account that they will be able to switch
networks in the future. We will maintain the assumption that prices are
fixed for the duration of the contract. Now their expectations about network
growth and actual calls made will be aligned.
This assumption leads to a redefinition of the subscriber market share y
in (9). More precisely, the discounted surplus that every consumer expects
to receive when joining network i at time t is
w˜i (t) =
1
r + χ
(s˜i (t) v0 + s˜j (t) vm − Fi) +K,
and subscriber shares become:
yi (t) =
1
2
+
σ
r + χ
[s˜i (t) (vii − vji)− s˜j (t) (vjj − vij)− Fi + Fj ] .
Aligning consumers’ expectations of who they will call with the calls they
will actually make returns per-minutes prices to marginal cost:
Proposition 13 If clients have rational expectations about network sizes and
their own permanence on networks, per-minute prices will be at cost.
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Proof. Following the same logic as in the previous Proposition, network i
solves s˜imaxpii {vii + (pii − c) qii} and s˜j maxpij {vij + (pij − c−m) qij}, both
of which lead to marginal-cost pricing.
Thus as long as consumer expectations are consistent with their effect on
profits, marginal-cost pricing will prevail.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a first go at a full dynamic model of compe-
tition between telecommunications networks. In particular, we have shown
that some “obvious” conclusions concerning network effects need no longer
hold when firms pricing decisions are taken into account. Such a conclusion
is that tariff-mediated network effects are always to the detriment of the en-
trant. We have shown two significant results in this respect: These network
effects matter for long-run market shares if and only if there are locked-in
clients at the incumbent at the entry date.7 On the other hand, (small)
tariff-mediated network effects in the presence of locked-in clients at the in-
cumbent imply that the long-run difference in subscribers is smaller than the
initial number of locked-in clients, i.e. the entrant can partially catch up.
We have also shown that asymmetric termination rates, be it mobile-
to-mobile or fixed-to-mobile, are to the advantages of the network with the
higher rates, both in terms of market share and profits.
While in this paper we have concentrated on the effects in the long run,
future research will consider short-run growth through numerical simulations.
7ERG (2008) contains a simple simulation model which “demonstrates” that entrants’
and incumbents’ market shares quickly converge, but this model assumes that there are
no locked-in consumers.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. 1. Value function: Substitute Fj = g
j
1sj + g
j
0 = g
j
1Z + g
j
0 − g
j
1si into
yi and define the parameters z = ζ/ (r + χ) and
P i11 = −Qi, P22 = −σz, P
i
12 = σz
(
2δ − gj1
)
,
P i1 = (ZQi + Ri) , P
i
2 = z
(
1
2
− σδjZ + σ
(
gj0 + g
j
1Z
))
.
Also, let
f i0 = (r + χ)P2 + χYi, f
i
1 = (r + χ)P12 − χ, f2 = (r + χ)P22,
then
πi = P
i
11s
2
i + P22F
2
i + P
i
12siFi + P
i
1si + P
i
2Fi,
s˙i = f
i
0 + f
i
1si + f2Fi.
Substituting these into the HJB equation results in
r
(
V i2 s
2 + V i1 s+ V
i
0
)
−
(
V˙ i2 s
2 + V˙ i1 s+ V˙
i
0
)
=
max
F
{
P i2F + P
i
12sF + P22F
2 + P i11x
2 + P i1s
+
(
2V i2 s+ V
i
1
) (
f i0 + f
i
1s+ f2F
)}
2. Policy function: The maximization in the HJB equation produces the
first-order condition
P i2 + P
i
12s+ 2P22F +
(
2V i2 s+ V
i
1
)
f2 = 0,
with second-order condition 2P22 = −
2σζ
r+χ
< 0. Solving for F leads to
F = −
(2V i2f2 + P
i
12)
2P22
s−
(V i1f2 + P
i
2)
2P22
,
or
gi1 = −
2V i2f2 + P
i
12
2P22
= δ −
gj1
2
− (r + χ)V i2
gi0 = −
V i1f2 + P
i
2
2P22
=
1
4σ
+
gj1Z + g
j
0 − δjZ
2
−
r + χ
2
V i1
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Solving the two conditions for gi1 and g
j
1 leads to
gi1 =
2
3
δ +
2
3
(r + χ)
(
V j2 − 2V
i
2
)
,
and the two corresponding conditions for gi0 and g
j
0 imply
gi0 =
1
2σ
−
1
3
δjZ −
r + χ
3
(
V j1 + 2V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)
.
3. Value function parameters: Substituting Fi = g
i
1s + g
i
0 as maximizer into
the value function, and grouping coefficients associated to the same power of
s, we obtain the three conditions
V˙ i2 = −P
i
12g1 − P22g
2
1 − P
i
11 +
(
r − 2
(
f i1 + f2g
i
1
))
V i2 , (22)
V˙ i1 =
(
r − f i1 − f2g
i
1
)
V i1 − 2V
i
2
(
f i0 + f2g
i
0
)
(23)
−P i2g
i
1 − P
i
12g
i
0 − 2P22g
i
0g
i
1 − P
i
1,
V˙ i0 = rV
i
0 − V
i
1
(
f i0 + f2g
i
0
)
− P i2g
i
0 − P22
(
gi0
)2
. (24)
3a. Parameters V i2 and V
j
2 : Substituting the original parameter values into
(22), we obtain
V˙ i2 = Qi + (r + 2χ)V
i
2 −
4
9
zσ
(
δ + (r + χ)
(
V i2 + V
j
2
))2
DefiningW2 = V
i
2 +V
j
2 , Q = (Qi +Qj) /2 and summing (22) over both i and
j, yields
W˙2 = 2Q+ (r + 2χ)W2 −
8σ
9
Z˙ + χZ
r + χ
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
2 , (25)
which is a non-autonomous Riccati differential equation for W2 which has a
unique solution given the boundary condition that we will derive using the
long-run equilibrium. Given a solution W2, V
i
2 can be determined by the
linear differential equation
V˙ i2 = Qi + (r + 2χ)V
i
2 −
4σ
9
Z˙ + χZ
r + χ
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
2 , (26)
with a corresponding long-run boundary condition.
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3b. Parameters V i1 and V
j
1 : Using (23), we find the coupled linear differ-
ential equations
V˙ i1 =
4σζ
9
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
(
δjZ −
3
2σ
r + χ
+ V j1 − V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)
(27)
+(r + χ)V i1 − 2χYiV
i
2 − ZQi −Ri,
V˙ j1 =
4σζ
9
(δ + (r + χ)W2)
(
δiZ −
3
2σ
r + χ
+ V i1 − V
j
1 + 2ZV
i
2
)
(28)
+(r + χ)V j1 − 2χYjV
j
2 − ZQj −Rj .
3c. Parameters V i0 and V
j
0 : Using (24), we find the linear differential equa-
tions
V˙ i0 = rV
i
0 − χYiV
i
1 −
σ (r + χ) ζ
9
(
δjZ −
3
2σ
r + χ
+ V j1 − V
i
1 + 2ZV
j
2
)2
. (29)
Proof of Proposition 6: Proof. 1. The expression for W¯2 is found by
solving (13) with W˙2 = 0. For symmetric MTRs, i.e. Qi = Q and δi = δ, we
have
Q = mq (c+m) = q (c)m+ q′ (c)m2 +O
(
m3
)
δ = v (c)− v (c+m) = q (c)m+
1
2
q′ (c)m2 +O
(
m3
)
,
thus Q ≈ δ for m ≈ 0. The term under the root is certainly positive for m
small enough, because then also δ is small. It can be shown that W¯2 < 0
if either δ ≥ 9(r+2χ)
16σψ
(which we rule out) or if δ < 9(r+2χ)
16σψ
and 9Q (r + χ) −
4δ2ψσ > 0. Joining the two leads to the sufficient conditions Q (r + χ) −
δ
4
(r + 2χ) > (r + χ)
(
Q− δ
2
)
> 0 since Q ≈ δ for small m. This result
continues to hold if the mi are small but different. On the other hand, the
larger root W¯ ′2 of W˙2 = 0 cannot be negative because there would be a
contradiction with the term under the root sign having to be non-negative.
This latter result does not depend on the mi being small.
2. As for V¯ i2 , solve (14) with V˙
i
2 = 0 using the long-run condition for W2
to substitute out the quadratic term, to obtain
V¯ i2 =
Qj −Qi
2 (r + 2χ)
+
W¯2
2
.
The expression for V¯ i1 is more complicated,
V¯ i1 =
2χYiV¯
i
2 + ZQi +Ri
r + χ
−
2ζ
(
δ + (r + χ) W¯2
) (
2σδjZ − 3 + 2σ (r + χ)
(
2ZV¯ j2 −
(
V¯ i1 − V¯
j
1
)))
9 (r + χ)2
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with
(
V¯ i1 − V¯
j
1
)
=
(
Z −
Aζ
(r + χ)
)
Qi −Qj
r + 2χ
−
(1 +A)Z
2 (r + χ)
(δ1 − δ2)
−A
χX11 (Yi − Yj) + (R1 −R2)
(r + χ)
and A =
(
8σζ
9(r+χ)
(
δ + (r + χ) W¯2
)
− 1
)
−1
. The last term, V¯ i0 , again follows
directly from V˙ i0 = 0.
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